Passenger data: Switzerland to screen all foreign flights from 2027
The new Flight Passenger Data Act creates a central screening unit at fedpol. Most records are deleted after six months – but risk profiles and the storage of unsuspected travellers remain contested.
The Federal Council has set the start date: the Flight Passenger Data Act enters into force on 1 November 2026, and the new Passenger Information Unit (PIU) at the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) takes up its work on 1 February 2027. Switzerland will thereby systematically match the booking and travel data of passengers on international flights against police and risk data.
The decisive point is this: travellers do not have to provide any new information when booking. What is captured is data that airlines and travel agencies store anyway. What is new is that this data is transmitted to fedpol for all flights from abroad into Switzerland and from Switzerland abroad, and evaluated for the fight against terrorism and for serious crimes listed in the law.
More than a name and a flight number
The statutory data set is broad. It can include names, contact details, booking code, itinerary, method of payment, seat, baggage, frequent flyer data, travel agency and fellow travellers. Airlines deliver the available information twice: between 48 and 24 hours before the planned departure and immediately after boarding is completed.
Particularly sensitive information such as ethnic origin, political opinion, religion, health or sexual orientation is not part of the PNR data set, according to fedpol. The authority may use the transmitted data only for offences that the law explicitly names. Alongside terrorist offences, these include human trafficking, serious drug offences, organised theft, money laundering and certain forms of cybercrime.
An algorithm does not yet make a police case
The PIU automatically matches the records against police information systems, watchlists and risk profiles. A technical hit, however, must not be passed on to a police or law enforcement authority without review. PIU staff must manually check every match and clarify the identity.
Access, too, is staggered. Police authorities do not receive unrestricted access to the entire PNR database. The PIU passes on verified hits or carries out research in response to a justified written request. Risk profiles may contain combinations of travel data, but must not be tailored to a specific person. Watchlists with a personal reference, by contrast, require a direct link to an offence named in the law.
The new unit starts smaller than the scope of the task might suggest. In 2027 it begins with eight staff and limited operations. For 2028, 14 positions are planned; for full operation from 2030, the Confederation expects around 30 full-time positions. The build-up proceeds step by step, according to operating hours, data volume and the number of connected flight routes.
The data protection conflict begins with unsuspected people
The strongest safeguard lies in the deletion periods. Data without a marking is automatically pseudonymised after one month and deleted after six months. Marked records may be stored for a maximum of five years. Anyone wanting to re-assign pseudonymised information to a person generally requires the consent of the Federal Administrative Court. In urgent cases, the fedpol directorate may decide provisionally, but must obtain the approval afterwards.
The legislator was thereby responding to objections based on fundamental rights. The conflict has not been resolved, however: even the data of people under no suspicion whatsoever remains directly attributable for one month and is stored for six months in total. The Political Institutions Committee of the National Council had demanded that this retention without any indication of terrorism or serious crime be dropped entirely. In parliament, however, more far-reaching data protection proposals did not prevail.
The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner reviewed the data protection impact assessment and demanded clarifications. He will in future supervise the PIU's data processing. Passengers must be informed about the transfer when booking and may request information from fedpol about the processing of their data.
What matters is practice from February onwards
The law therefore creates neither a limitless passenger database nor a purely targeted search for already known suspects. It introduces systematic screening of all international air travel, but limits its use through the catalogue of offences, manual checks, pseudonymisation, deletion periods and oversight.
Whether these safeguards are sufficient will only become clear in operation. What matters is not only the number of serious crimes detected, but equally the frequency of false hits, the quality of the risk profiles and proof that the data of unsuspected people really does disappear within the deadlines.
Sources
- Federal Council: Entry into force of the Flight Passenger Data Act
- Federal Assembly: Flight Passenger Data Act of 21 March 2025
- fedpol: Topic page on the Flight Passenger Data Act
- FDJP: Fighting terrorism and serious crime with PNR
- Parliament: Data protection questions and the demand against data retention
- FDPIC: Activity report 2024/2025
