Arms Boom: Despite Record Spending, Weapons Remain Scarce
Globally, 2.9 trillion dollars flow into armed forces – but production capacities, skilled workers, and supply chains struggle to keep up. Switzerland also waits years for new air defense systems.
Nearly Three Trillion Dollars – But Not For Weapons Alone
The record sum of 2.887 trillion dollars initially sounds like a massive expansion of global arms production. However, military expenditures encompass much more than just the purchase of new weapons.
According to SIPRI, on average, only about one third of military spending goes towards weapons, military equipment, and research and development. A large portion is needed for salaries, operations, maintenance, infrastructure, and other ongoing costs.
Even if states massively increase their defense budgets, this does not automatically lead to more production capacity for missiles, air defense systems, artillery ammunition, or fighter jets.
The Arms Boom Even Slowed Down in 2025
Despite the new record, a closer look at the development is worthwhile. Global military spending increased by 2.9 percent in real terms in 2025. The previous year, the increase had been 9.7 percent.
The long-term trend, however, remains clear: between 2016 and 2025, global military spending increased by 41 percent, according to SIPRI. In 2025, the world spent more on the military than ever before in SIPRI's time series.
Demand is growing particularly strongly in Europe. European military spending increased by 14 percent to 864 billion dollars in 2025. In Asia and Oceania, it also rose by 8.1 percent to 681 billion dollars.
Europe Orders Simultaneously – Industry Cannot Grow Indefinitely Fast
This is precisely where a central bottleneck arises. Many European states are simultaneously increasing their defense spending and want to replenish their stockpiles. At the same time, the industry must expand production lines, find new skilled workers, and secure its supply chains.
The problem is historical. After the end of the Cold War, production capacities were reduced, factories closed, and inventories cut in many Western states. The arms industry adjusted to significantly lower demand.
The concentration is particularly evident in the USA. According to SRF, the number of large aerospace and defense companies there decreased from 51 to five due to mergers. At the same time, many manufacturers now rely on the same suppliers.
If skilled workers, electronic components, raw materials, or specialized production facilities are lacking, production cannot therefore be multiplied at short notice. A factory cannot simply switch overnight from peacetime production to maximum wartime production.
An Order Is Not Yet A Ready-To-Use Weapon
Years can pass between a political decision and a ready-to-use weapon system. Complex systems such as air defense, fighter jets, or long-range precision weapons consist of numerous components, some of which come from different manufacturers and suppliers.
This is compounded by tests, certifications, training, and integration into existing armed forces structures. Increasing demand therefore does not immediately lead to a correspondingly higher number of operational systems.
Especially for highly complex weapons, production capacity is limited. If several states order simultaneously, delivery dates can shift by years.
Arms Procurement Is Also Geopolitics
For states, it is therefore not only about the price of a weapon system. Delivery times, available production capacities, spare parts, maintenance, and long-term supply security are also crucial.
Added to this is a geopolitical risk: In an international crisis, a manufacturing state can prioritize other customers. This is precisely what is currently happening with various air defense systems. Anyone who places an order in a tense market situation cannot assume that the originally expected delivery date will remain unchanged.
This is particularly relevant for smaller countries. They usually do not have their own production capacities for all important weapon systems and are therefore dependent on foreign manufacturers.
Switzerland Waits Years For Patriot
Switzerland is currently experiencing this conflict of objectives itself. This is particularly evident in the procurement of the Patriot air defense system.
The USA has re-prioritized the delivery of Patriot systems in connection with support for Ukraine. This significantly delays delivery to Switzerland.
Initially, a delay of four to five years was mentioned. In May 2026, the DDPS announced that a delay of five to seven years must now be expected. The timetable is therefore significantly longer than originally planned.
The DDPS therefore temporarily withheld payments and examined alternative options. In June 2026, the Federal Council decided to resume payments for Patriot to continue the project with the least possible delay and additional costs. At the same time, Switzerland began negotiations with manufacturers from France, Israel, and South Korea for a second system.
The Patriot procurement thus exemplifies that high defense spending alone does not guarantee immediate availability. Switzerland can pay – but it cannot increase international production capacity itself.
The Costs Of Waiting Also Rise
Delays also have financial consequences. In the Swiss Patriot project, not only are delivery dates uncertain. Costs have also increased.
At the beginning of September 2026, SRF reported that a deal originally examined with Germany had failed. This is expected to incur additional costs of at least 700 million Swiss Francs for Switzerland; delivery will be postponed until the 2030s.
This shows another effect of the global arms boom: when production capacities become scarce, delays can not only complicate military planning but also make procurement projects more expensive.
Mass Production and High-Tech Are Needed Simultaneously
However, the increasing demand does not affect all weapon systems equally. Experience from the war in Ukraine shows that armed forces need both large quantities of relatively inexpensive systems and highly complex weapons.
Small drones can be deployed in large numbers and replaced comparatively quickly. At the same time, systems for defense against ballistic missiles, modern fighter jets, and long-range precision weapons remain technologically demanding and expensive.
Therefore, in addition to established defense companies, smaller companies are increasingly entering the market – especially with drones, software, and artificial intelligence applications.
Whether these new providers can actually alleviate the existing bottlenecks, however, remains to be seen. New technologies also require skilled workers, electronics, production facilities, and robust supply chains.
The Arms Boom Also Changes Procurement
For armed forces, the new situation means a fundamental change. For decades, many states could assume that modern weapon systems could be ordered as needed. Today's situation shows the limits of this model.
Production capacities, inventories, and supply chains themselves become part of security policy. Anyone who relies on a system in an emergency must not only know its technical performance but also how quickly replacements can be delivered.
This is particularly relevant for Switzerland. The country remains dependent on foreign suppliers for many key weapon systems. Complete industrial independence would be unrealistic – however, too strong a dependence on individual supplier countries can become a strategic risk.
More Money Does Not Immediately Solve The Bottleneck
The global arms boom is therefore less contradictory than it initially appears. States are spending record sums, while at the same time weapons are scarce because demand is growing faster than the industrial capacity to produce certain systems.
Building new capacities takes time. Factories must be expanded, skilled workers trained, suppliers established, and production processes ramped up. For complex weapon systems, years can pass before additional capacities are actually available.
The crucial bottleneck is therefore not just money. It is about production capacity, time, and control over supply chains.
This is precisely why a country can spend significantly more on its army today and still wait years for the ordered weapons.
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