Czechia Rearms Against Russia – What Does This Mean for Switzerland?

While the USA is currently trying again to initiate talks about ending the Ukraine war, Czechia is simultaneously preparing for a potential failure of diplomacy. A new long-term defense paper from the Czech Ministry of Defense describes Russia as the greatest threat to the country's security and warns of a worsening European security situation.

The «Long-Term Outlook for Defense 2045» is not a prediction of war by 2045. The year indicates the planning horizon of the document. The paper aims to define which military and civilian capabilities Czechia will need in the coming two decades.

The central message, however, is clear: Prague wants to align its defense capabilities for a possible long-term conflict with a technologically advanced adversary.

For Switzerland, Czech rearmament is less interesting than the underlying question: What does a permanently heightened security situation mean for a neutral state in the middle of Europe?

Prague Sees Russia as Greatest Threat

In its new strategy paper, the Czech Ministry of Defense assumes that the likelihood of complex security crises is increasing. This explicitly includes the possibility of an attack on NATO and EU states without long warning times.

At the same time, the document describes a shift in responsibility for Europe's conventional defense: European NATO states must increasingly take care of their own security in the future.

Czechia is responding with long-term defense planning. The paper was approved by the Czech State Security Council and is to be discussed by the government in autumn. It builds on Czechia's 2023 defense strategy, which had already identified Russia as the gravest threat.

Besides a possible conventional war, the draft also names cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, sabotage, and economic pressure as security policy risks.

It's About More Than Tanks and Fighter Jets

It is remarkable how broadly Czechia defines the concept of defense capability.

By 2030, a modern system for the population's security preparedness is to be established. By 2032, the expansion of indigenous space reconnaissance capabilities is planned. By 2038, additional reserves of weapons, technology, and military equipment are to be built up.

The armed forces themselves are also to be further modernized. Czechia is committed to purchasing 24 F-35 fighter jets and plans two modernized brigades – a heavy brigade with main battle tanks and a medium brigade with wheeled armored personnel carriers.

Behind this lies a fundamental idea: A modern conflict is not decided by soldiers and weapons alone. Ammunition and spare parts, logistics, industrial production capacities, reconnaissance, communication, cyber defense, and a state's ability to remain functional even under crisis conditions are equally crucial.

2045 Is Not a War Date

The year in the document's name can easily be misunderstood. Czechia is not predicting that a war with Russia will occur by 2045.

2045 is the long-term planning horizon.

Precisely this long-term perspective is crucial for security policy. Military capabilities cannot be built up within a few months. Fighter jets, air defense, ammunition, vehicles, communication systems, and military infrastructure require years for planning, procurement, training, and establishment.

Czechia is therefore trying not to react to a specific war date, but to orient its capabilities so that it remains capable of action even in the event of an unexpected deterioration of the situation.

Trump Assesses the Danger Differently

The Czech assessment stands in remarkable contrast to statements by US President Donald Trump.

Trump recently stated that he does not expect Vladimir Putin to attack NATO territory. He referred to his direct contacts with the Russian president.

Thus, two different risk assessments clash: Washington's president currently sees no reason to assume a planned Russian attack on NATO territory. Prague, on the other hand, explicitly plans its defense for a scenario where the European security situation escalates further.

This does not have to be a contradiction. A state can consider an attack not to be imminent and still take precautions for a possible long-term risk.

The Threat Does Not Begin Only With War

For Czechia, the security policy challenge is not limited to a classic military attack anyway.

Cyberattacks, espionage, disinformation, and sabotage can already occur in peacetime. Precisely these so-called hybrid threats make the line between peace and open conflict less clear.

A current example comes from Germany. On August 4, 2026, an explosive-laden drone was discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport. According to its own statements, the German government concluded, based on police investigations, crime patterns, and intelligence findings, that Russia was responsible for the attempted hybrid attack. Russia denies the allegations.

The case shows why European states now understand their security planning more broadly. Critical infrastructure, airports, energy supply, communication networks, and authorities can become targets of attacks without a classic war being declared.

What Does This Mean for Switzerland?

Switzerland is not a NATO member. It is militarily neutral and therefore cannot count on an automatic mutual assistance obligation from an alliance.

However, this does not mean it would be isolated in terms of security policy. Switzerland cooperates with European states and NATO, among others, within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. For the years 2025 to 2028, the cooperation goals with NATO were further expanded – including interoperability, space, resilience, and communication.

At the same time, the Swiss Security Policy Strategy 2026 states that the security policy environment has significantly deteriorated. It names military risks as well as cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, and sabotage as threats that can affect Switzerland.

Switzerland pursues a comprehensive security approach: In addition to the army, civilian authorities, cantons, critical infrastructures, and international cooperation are part of security preparedness.

The Swiss Question Is Not Just: How Many Soldiers?

The discussion about Czechia's rearmament could therefore fall short if it is transferred solely to the size of the army in Switzerland.

For a neutral state, several questions arise simultaneously: Can Switzerland adequately protect its airspace? Does it have sufficient means for ground defense? Are ammunition and material reserves sufficient? How resilient are power supply, communication, and other critical infrastructures?

And how quickly could Switzerland expand its capabilities in the event of a sudden deterioration of the situation?

This is precisely one of the biggest challenges of long-term security policy. An army cannot be adapted to a new threat situation in the short term.