AI, Drones and Cyber: Why Switzerland Must Rework Its Procurement

Anyone who talks about a high-tech revolution in defence often thinks first of spectacular images: small drones above the battlefield, artificial intelligence analysing imagery, or cyberattacks on screens. For Switzerland, however, the harder question comes before any deployment. It is: can a system be procured in time, safely embedded in existing structures, updated, and kept operational in an emergency?

The Federal Council has in the meantime outlined the answer at a strategic level. The 2026 Security Policy Strategy prioritises resilience, protection and defence capability. It names hybrid threats and attacks from a distance as likely risks. The defence guidelines add that the protection of critical infrastructure, command capability, counter-drone defence, electronic warfare and the protection of networks and data should be given priority.

That is more than a list of new equipment. It is an admission that the logic of procurement has to change.

The bottleneck is the time between testing and deployment

Classic armament programmes are often planned over many years. With software, sensors, counter-drone systems or digital communication systems, that timespan can become problematic: technology keeps advancing, threats change, and a system may lose relative capability before it is widely fielded.

The Federal Council's armament policy strategy responds to this with a clear course. Procurements should be faster, more flexible and more closely aligned with technology cycles. Where it makes sense, the army should rely on systems available on the market that meet international standards. Special requirements that would have to be developed for Switzerland alone should be reduced.

This is not a minor detail buried in the administration. It affects operational readiness. A technically sound system is of little use if spare parts are missing, updates arrive too late, or it does not work reliably with partners and existing command networks. Conversely, a market-available solution can only make sense if it fits into the Swiss security architecture and is mastered both legally and operationally.

Speed requires verifiable limits

Faster procurement must not be confused with uncritical procurement. Especially with security-relevant software, sensor technology and radio links, testing, independent technical assessment and clearly defined operational limits are needed. The gain comes when these checks happen early and repeatedly – not when they have to be made up at the end of a shortened project.

Sovereignty does not mean building everything at home

Switzerland cannot manufacture every security-relevant technology itself. Its armament policy therefore makes no claim to autarky. It combines domestic capabilities with European cooperation: for goods outside the state treaty area, it aims – where economically and security-politically sensible – for a higher share of procurement in Switzerland and in Europe.

The goal behind this is more concrete than a label of origin. It is about knowledge, maintenance, secure data channels and supply chains that do not abruptly break off in a crisis. The strategy envisages, for instance, identifying critical supply chains, reducing dependencies and diversifying suppliers. It also aims to step up the international exchange of tests and evaluations.